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Abstract. Populations of replicating entities frequently experience sudden or cyclical
changes in environment. We explore the implications of this phenomenon via a environ-
mental switching parameter in several common evolutionary dynamics models including the
replicator dynamic for linear symmetric and asymmetric landscapes, the Moran process, and
incentive dynamics. We give a simple relationship between the probability of environmental
switching, the relative fitness gain, and the effect on long term behavior in terms of fixation
probabilities and long term outcomes for deterministic dynamics. We also discuss cases
where the dynamic changes, for instance a population evolving under a replicator dynamic
switching to a best-reply dynamic and vice-versa, giving Lyapunov stability results.
1. Introduction
Many replicating organisms live in periodically or suddenly changing selective landscapes.
It may be easier to list non-examples than to attempt to describe the many biological sce-
narios for which this phenomenon holds; we describe a few for motivation. Intermittent
or frequent flooding is a very simple example of a stochastically switching environment.
Such organisms may behave very differently depending on the environment, for instance in
the presence of water, such as the flowering of desert plants and the reproductive cycle of
some amphibians. Sometimes the organism can survive in both environments yet can only
reproduce in one environment, or the organism reproduces at very different rates in the
two environments. An adaptive advantage of a subpopulation may fixate quickly or not at
all depending on the relative advantage, the cost of the variant behavior or trait, and the
frequency at which the environments switch.
Sickle-cell anemia is a well-known instance of heterozygote advantage in humans [3] [1],
which we frame simply in the following way. During normal environmental conditions, having
the gene for sickle-cell anemia on both chromosomes (homozygous for sickle-cell) is maladap-
tive, and simply being a carrier (heterozygous) is also of lower fitness because some offspring
may exhibit the disease. During malaria outbreaks, however, sickle-cell carriers have a fit-
ness advantage due to conferred malaria resistance. Thus there is selection pressure against
the extinction of malarial-resistance alleles in places where malaria outbreaks are common,
and we can model this as a population of two types (sickle-cell carriers and wild-type) with
two different selective landscapes that alter the order of fitness for the two types. Call these
two landscapes E1, corresponding to the non-malarial environment, and E2, when malaria
is present in the population, food-supply, or when the population is otherwise exposed to
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malaria. We will assume that the population experiences environment E1 with probability
p and environment E2 with probability 1− p.
The social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum has a complex life-cycle [24] [9] [10], which
we simplistically model as follows. For part of the life cycle, Dictyostelium cells behave
independently as single-celled organisms, foraging for food. As food becomes scarce, some of
the single-cells come back together to form a spore-dispersing fruiting-body. We model this
as a stochastic environment corresponding to the presence of food or not, and two population
types (cooperators and defectors). The E1 landscape is the independent single-celled case,
where defectors have the advantage, since cooperating together would lessen the total area
in which the population forages, concentrating the subpopulation of cooperators in a smaller
area (thus making less food available to cooperators on average). The E2 environment favors
cooperators, since as food becomes scarce, the cells that participate in the fruiting body have
a larger change of reproducing and surviving in the longer term than the individuals that
continue to forage locally. E1 is a prisoner’s dilemma favoring defectors and E2 could be
modeled as a constant relative fitness landscape with r > 1 for cooperators (the fitness for
defectors is non-zero since the defectors could stumble upon a new food source).
We can also interpret the proposed model as giving a relationship between the evolution
and fixation of traits that respond to rare events and environments in terms of the difference
in fitnesses conferred by the trait and probability of the rare environment. Intuitively, a
sufficiently rare event may not provide enough exposure for a relevant trait to be fixate, such
as an organism being crushed by a meteor. This event is likely too rare and too extreme for
a trait defending against it to arise, and even if such a trait arises by chance, it is unlikely
to persist selectively because of the rarity of the event. More generally, if the cost of the
responsive trait is too large and the alternate environment is not common enough, such a
trait may fail to persist in the population.
This simple model is in contrast to a model in which the fitness landscape is explicitly
time-dependent, such as temperature variation in different seasons, in which the environ-
ment continuously cycles through different extremes. Although such a model may be more
accurate, it poses substantial analytic difficulties. Henceforth we will not consider explicit
examples of the above scenarios or others; rather we pursue models that could apply to
these scenarios and many others in the context of evolutionary dynamics. We present our
models in terms of a deterministic replicator dynamic [19] [27] [30] [18] with symmetric and
asymmetric landscapes, the Moran process [25] [26] [29] [28] [14], a probabilistic Markov
process, and for the deterministic incentive dynamics [11]. In the deterministic cases, we
are essentially assuming infinitely large populations in which in any given time interval, the
environments E1 and E2 are experienced for proportions p and 1 − p of the interval, re-
spectively. A more realistic model would be that the population experiences each landscape
continuously for intervals of relative length p and 1 − p, however we find good agreement
with the Moran process in terms of fixation probabilities [4], which are essentially averaged
over all sequences of E1 and E2 appearing with probabilities p and 1− p. In other words, we
primarily investigate mean dynamics rather than those in which the switching parameter is
truly stochastic (e.g. a random variable). Such models may have significantly more interest-
ing behaviors, but are much more difficult to approach analytically, and are often analyzed
in the context of the average system [5]. Hence our strategy is to first understand the mean
dynamics to light the way for more stochastic approaches.
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2. Deterministic Replicator Dynamics for Symmetric Landscapes
We first consider the implications of the replicator equation, a standard continuous and
deterministic model of selection [27] [29]. The replicator equation takes a fitness landscape
f on n-types in an infinitely large population. The proportions of each type is denoted by
xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the proportions evolve in time as
x˙i = xi(fi(x)− f¯(x)),
where f¯(x) =
∑
i xifx(x) is the mean fitness. A common fitness landscape is f(x) = Ax,
where A is a game-matrix for the fitness payouts from interactions between the replicating
individuals of each type.
2.1. Constant Relative Fitness Landscapes. Abstractly, consider a model where a pop-
ulation consists of two types of replicators, and a stochastic environmental occurrence (such
as malaria outbreaks or frequent flooding). For a population of two replicating types 1 and
2, suppose during environment E1, occurring with probability p, that type 1 has relative
fitness s and that during environment E2, occurring with probability 1− p, that type 1 has
relative fitness t. Let Ar denote the matrix
Ar =
r r
1 1
 ,
which indicates that type 1 has relative fitness advantage r over type 2. The effective game
matrix for the two environments over a long period of time is simply Ar = pAs + (1− p)At,
and so r = ps+ (1− p)t.
For the replicator equation with game matrix Ar, either type A or B will fixate depending
on whether r > 1 or not. In terms of the stochastic environment parameter p, r > 1 iff
(1) p(s− t) > (1− t)
So we see that fixation depends on the rarity of the environmental stochasticity and the
relative fitnesses. The special case in which s > t = 1, meaning that both types have the
same fitness during environment E2 but type 1 has an advantage during environment E1,
then inequality (1) reduces to p > 0. In other words, type 1 will eventually dominate due to
its ability to respond to environment E1.
2.2. Frequency-dependent Fitness Landscapes. Ross Cressman gives a classification
of the phase portrait types of the replicator dynamics for linear 2x2 games as follows [8]. For
a game matrix
Aa,b,c,d =
a b
c d
 ,
we have the four phase portraits described in Table 1.
Constant relative fitness landscapes are special cases of P1 and P2. We wish to know
under what conditions can a stochastically switching environment alter the behavior of the
replicator dynamic qualitatively, i.e. in terms of the phase portrait. The linear combination
of two arbitrary landscapes could have any particular portrait for various values of p. We
start with a simple example of combining the two Prisoner’s dilemma types. Let A(p) =
pA0,0,1,0 + (1 − p)A0,1,0,0. Then we have that A(0) is in class P1, A(1) is class P2, and all
3
Name Short Name Conditions Stable Equilibria Unstable Equilibria
Prisoner’s Dilemma P1 a ≤ c, d ≥ b (1, 0) (0, 1)
Prisoner’s Dilemma P2 a ≥ c, d ≤ b (0, 1) (1, 0)
Hawk-Dove HD a < c, d < b (xˆ, 1− xˆ) (0, 1), (1, 0)
Coordination Co a > c, d > b (0, 1), (1, 0) (xˆ, 1− xˆ)
Figure 1. Non-degenerate 2× 2 game behaviors (not both a = c and b = d).
Each has a distinct phase portrait and equilibria structure. The phase portraits
of degenerate cases where a = c and d = b are stationary at all points. The
internal rest point of the dynamic is xˆ = (d− b)/(d− b+ a− c).
other p are HD, since A(p) = A0,1−p,p,0 which has an internal stable equilibrium at (p, 1− p).
Similarly, if A(p) = pA0,0,0,1 + (1− p)A1,0,0,0, then the boundary points A(0) and A(1) are of
class P1 and P2 respectively and A(p) is Co for all other p, again with internal equilibrium
(but unstable) at (p, 1− p). So we see that for some E1 matrices, control over the stochastic
alternate environment E2 would allow the complete control over the dynamic outcomes of
the combined system.
Any portrait can be altered to any other portrait with the right choice of alternate en-
vironment and probability of occurrence. Theorem 1 shows that any 2 × 2 phase portrait
can be perturbed by a stochastic landscape into any other phase portrait. That there are
infinitely many such matrices is a result of the fact that adding a constant to any particular
column of the game matrix does not alter the phase portrait [18].
Theorem 1. Let E1, E2 ∈ {P1,P2,HD,Co} and p∗ ∈ (0, 1). For each matrix A1 with
elements such that A1 is a game matrix for phase portrait E1, there are infinitely many A2
with phase portrait E2 such that A(p) = pA1 + (1− p)A2 has portrait E1 for 0 < p < p∗ and
has portrait E2 for p
∗ < p < 1.
Proof. Since the signs of a − c and b − d are independent, it suffices to show just a single
special case, namely that if a1 < c1 then there are a2, c2 ∈ R with a2 > c2 and the matrices
A(p) are as in the conclusion of the theorem. Given A1 and p
∗, let b2 = b1, d2 = d1, and note
that a−c = 0 when p = p∗. Then a2 can be chosen arbitrarily and c2 = a2− p∗1−p∗ (c1−a1). 
For the case of a HD to Co transition (or vice versa), the interior rest point moves to the
boundary, changes stability for one instance, and moves back into the interior, in contrast
to the examples given above. In this context, A(p) = pA1 + (1− p)A2 has the portrait class
of E1 if A2 is any multiple of A1,0,1,0 or A0,1,0,1.
The classification of dynamics for 3× 3 games is much more extensive [6] [7]. We consider
only Rock-Scissors-Paper 3x3 games, with game matrix
Aa,b =

0 a −b
−b 0 a
a −b 0
 .
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Similarly to the 2 × 2 case, pAa1,b1 + (1 − p)Aa2,b2 = Aa′,b′ where a′ = a2 + p(a1 − a2) and
b′ = b2 + p(b1− b2). For the RSP matrix there are essentially three outcomes: (1) a = b 6= 0:
concentric orbits about the barycenter (1/3, 1/3, 1/3); (2) a > b: divergence to the boundary;
and (3) a < b: convergence to the barycenter. Hence if we have a1 = b1 and a2 < b2, then
a′ − b′ = (1− p)(a2 − b2) < 0, so a′ < b′ and the stochastic switching dynamic converges to
the barycenter for any p such that 0 < p < 1. In other words, the stochastic environmental
shifts are enough to break the concentric cycles and stabilize the population.
3. Replicator Dynamics for Asymmetric Landscapes
Now we consider examples where the fitness landscapes are described by separate matrices
for each type. Given a population with two subpopulations S1 and S2, the payoffs for the
interactions between them in the environment E1 are
S1 S2
S1 a11, a11 a12, a21
S2 a21, a12 a22, a22
.
Denote the payoff matrix as A. During environment E2 the payoff for the types changes to
S1 S2
S1 b11, b11 b12, b21
S2 b21, b12 b22, b22
,
which we denote the payoff matrix as B. As before we can write the expected game for the
population as
C =
 (1− p)a11 + pb11 (1− p)a12 + pb12(
1− p)a21 + pb21 (1− p)a22 + pb22
 .
Consider the case when strategy 1 (type 1) is the only Nash equilibria for the payoff
matrix A (hence S1 dominates), and strategy 2 (type 2) is the only Nash equilibria for the
payoff matrix B (hence S2 dominates). For the payoff matrix C, if c11 > c21, then a Nash
equilibria exists at
(
(1, 0), (1, 0)
)
. Notice that c11 > c21 is equivalent to
a11 − a21
b21 − b11 >
p
1− p .
Similarly, C has a Nash Equilibria at
(
(0, 1), (0, 1)
)
if
p
1− p >
a12 − a22
b22 − b12 . If the inequalities
a11 − a21
b21 − b11 <
p
1− p and
p
1− p <
a12 − a22
b22 − b12 hold, strategy 1 and strategy 2 are respectively
dominated.
From theses inequalities, we see that
(1) Strategy 1 dominates if min
{
a11 − a21
b21 − b11 ,
a12 − a22
b22 − b12
}
>
p
1− p ;
(2) Strategy 2 dominates if max
{
a11 − a21
b21 − b11 ,
a12 − a22
b22 − b12
}
<
p
1− p ;
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(3) C is a Co game if
a11 − a21
b21 − b11 >
p
1− p >
a12 − a22
b22 − b12 ;
(4) C is a HD game if
a11 − a21
b21 − b11 <
p
1− p <
a12 − a22
b22 − b12 .
Thus, if p  1 or 1 − p  1 then the population will fixate to S1 or S2, respectively.
If the probability p is not too large (or small), then the mixture gives rise to a HD or Co
game depending on the inequality of the ratios of the differences. Notice for the coordina-
tion game, since the initial frequencies of the population would dictate evolution, a mutant
subpopulation, though dominate during environment E2, would not be able to invade. Gen-
erally, given two arbitrary payoff matrices A and B, one can see that if a strategy is a Nash
equilibria in both A and B then this strategy is also a Nash equilibria in C. Similarly, if
a strategy is dominated in both A and B then this strategy is also dominated in C. An
interesting consequence is when a strategy is a Nash equilibria in A, and the same strategy
is dominated in B. Then there is a possibility for either characteristic for this strategy in C,
given the proper parameter p.
In contrast to the symmetric case, particular choices of A and B can have different portraits
for three intervals of nonzero length for p ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the explicit example when
A =
 5 4
3 0
 and B =
 −4 −12
−1 −6
 .
Calculating the ratios we see that
a11 − a21
b21 − b11 =
2
3
and
a12 − a22
b22 − b12 =
4
5
. If p < 2/5, the
population will evolve to S1; if p > 4/9, the populace will evolve to S2; and if 2/5 < p < 4/9,
the populace will evolve to a mixed population with the frequency
(
3p
1 + 2p
,
1− p
1 + 2p
)
.
4. Moran Process
This replicator dynamics-based model assumes both a large population and that there
are many environment switches such that they can be modeled as an average of E1 p of
the time and E2 1 − p of the time. We present an alternate model lacking both of these
assumptions based on the Moran process for constant relative fitness landscapes. Consider
a population as above of size N , with i individuals of type 1 and N − i individuals of type
2. Flip a p-biased coin, choosing E1 with probability p and E2 with probability 1− p. Then
choose the appropriate game matrix corresponding to either E1 or E2 and proceed with
the Moran process associated to this game matrix for one iteration, choosing an individual
to reproduce proportionally to fitness and an individual to be replaced at random. The
transition probabilities are:
Ti→i+1 =
ifi
ifi + (N − i)f2
N − i
N
Ti→i−1 =
(N − i)f2
if1 + (N − i)f2
i
N
,
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with Ti→i = 1− Ti→i+1 − Ti→i−1. The fitness landscape is given by
f1(i) =
a(i− 1) + b(N − i)
N − 1
f2(i) =
ci+ d(N − i− 1)
N − 1
for a game matrix defined by
A =
a b
c d

The classical Moran process is given by a = r = b, c = 1 = d. The process has two absorbing
states i = 0 and i = N , corresponding to the fixation of one of the two types. The sequence
of coin flips will have a substantial impact on the eventual outcome of the process (i.e. to
which type the population fixates). First let us consider the expected outcome, averaged
over the possible sequence of environmental states. Again suppose that we can model the
population with an effective game matrix Ar = pAs + (1− p)At. The fixation probability of
type 1 starting from population state (i, N − i) is
(2) φ =
1− r−i
1− r−N
where r = ps+ (1− p)t as before. Consider the probability that a single mutant adapted to
environment E1 will fixate. The fixation probability is:
φ =
1− r−1
1− r−N
with r = p(s − t) + t. Consider a large population N with r > 1 so that r−N is negligible.
Then φ = 1− 1/(p(s− t) + t), and depends on the value of p, t, and the difference in relative
fitnesses s− t. As expected, larger values of p and the fitness difference s− t lead to larger
values of φ. Moreover, we see that if type 1 has a very large advantage during a very rare
event, fixation may be very likely. Type 1 may proliferate during environment E2 simply
due to drift during the neutral fitness landscape, and when the rare environment E1 occurs,
type 1 dominates the fitness proportionate selection events.
In general the same reasoning applies, tempered by the population size N . For large N ,
fixation becomes likely (φ > 1/2) when r > 2, that is, when p > (2 − t)/(s − t), assuming
s > t. Of course, variant types may persist for a long period of time before either type
fixates. Compare this to the derivation above showing that the deterministic dynamic fixates
the variant type if p > (1−t)/(s−t), and note that (2−t)/(s−t) = 1/(s−t)+(1−t)/(s−t).
Depending on the values of t and s, the Moran process can predicts likely elimination even
in cases where the deterministic dynamic fixates the mutant! For example, if s = 3 and
t = 1/2, the the deterministic landscape fixates for p > 2/5 but the Moran process does not
predict likely fixation until p > 3/5.
4.1. Generational Processes. Let us also briefly consider generational processes, such as
the Wright-Fisher process [21] and the n-fold Moran process [16]. The latter process is
defined like the Moran processes, however each step of the process is defined not by a single
replication event but rather by N -replication events, where N is the population size. This
does not change the fixation probabilities, except in the following special case. If s = 0
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Figure 2. Fixation probabilities for a population of size N = 20 and t = 1.
Along the horizontal axis runs the probability p; along the vertical runs the
relative fitness s.
and t > 0, when the population is subject to environment E1, every fitness proportionate
replication event will result in the reproduction of type 2, so a fully generational process
will fixate on type 2. In other words, if the population must undergo an entire generation
in one environment, it may strongly select the more adapted type than if the stochastic
environmental changes are more fleeting.
A concrete example would be an organism that lives in an environment that periodically
floods, say E1, like certain amphibians. If water is required to reproduce successfully for
one of the two types, say type 1, T1-individuals can only reproduce when environment E1 is
active (meaning t = 0). A prolonged period (such as the time required for a full generation
to pass) without flooding may lead to the extinction of type 1 completely, even if type 1 is
far more effective than type 2 at reproducing during flooding (i.e. s >> 1).
5. Stochastic Incentive Switching
Now we consider models which allow not only how the fitness landscape to change but
also how the population interacts with the fitness landscape. We introduce the notion
of an incentive, a functional parameter with the following properties that simultaneously
generalizes common game dynamics like the replicator, the orthogonal-projection, the logit,
and the best-reply dynamics. We briefly cover preliminaries here; see [11] [17]. Table 3 lists
incentive functions for some common dynamics.
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Motivated by game-theoretic considerations, the incentive dynamics takes the form
(3) x˙i = ϕi(x)− xi
∑
j
ϕj(x).
Dynamics Incentive
Replicator ϕi(x) = xi
(
fi(x)− f¯(x)
)
Best Reply ϕi(x) = BRi(x)− xi
Logit ϕi(x) =
exp(η−1fi(x))∑
j exp(η
−1fj(x))
Projection ϕi(x) =

fi(x)− 1|S(f(x), x)|
∑
j∈S(f(x),x)
fj(x) if i ∈ S(f(x), x)
0 else
Figure 3. Incentives for some common dynamics, where BRi(x) is the best
reply to state x, S(f(x), x) is the set of all strategies in the support of x as
well as any collection of pure strategies in the complement of the support that
maximize the average. Note that on the interior of the simplex the projection
incentive is just ϕi(x) = fi(x)− 1/n
∑
j fj(x). For more examples see Table 1
in [11].
One interpretation of an incentive is that it mediates how the population interacts with
the fitness landscape, though strictly-speaking an incentive requires no fitness landscape.
The natural stability concept for incentive dynamics is the incentive stable state (ISS),
and there is a natural generalization [13] of the well-known Lyapunov theorem [2] for the
replicator equation to incentive dynamics. An incentive stable state is a state xˆ such that in
a neighborhood of xˆ the following inequality holds
(4)
∑
i
xˆiϕi(x)
xi
>
∑
i
xiϕi(xi)
xi
.
The KL-divergence on discrete probability distributions is a positive definite function
defined [22] as
DKL(x) = DKL(xˆ||x) =
∑
i
xˆi log xi − xˆi log xˆi.
Theorem (Fryer, 2011). If the state xˆ is an interior incentive stable state for the corre-
sponding incentive dynamics, then DKL(x) is a local Lyapunov function.
The incentive ϕi(x) = xifi(x) captures the classical result for the replicator dynamics [2]
for all incentives locally, with the definition of ISS being exactly evolutionary stability (ESS):
xˆ · f(x) > x · f(x). For many common dynamics, such as the replicator, best reply, and
orthogonal projection dynamics, the ISS condition is the same as ESS. This allows us to
formulate the following theorem, which is an easy and direct consequence of the definition
of incentive and Fryer’s Theorem, and so we omit the proof.
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Theorem 2. Let ϕ and ψ be incentives. Then
(1) the function ϕp = pϕ+ (1− p)ψ is an incentive for all p ∈ [0, 1]; and
(2) if xˆ is an ISS for both ϕ and ψ then xˆ is an ISS for ϕp and the KL-divergence is a
local Lyapunov function for the incentive dynamic defined by ϕp.
Suppose that f is a fitness landscape with ESS xˆ and let ϕ and ψ to be the incentives
for the replicator and the best reply dynamics, respectively, associated with the landscape
f . Then for all p ∈ [0, 1], ϕp has ESS xˆ and we have a local Lyapunov function from the KL-
divergence. Similarly, we can combine the replicator incentive and the projection incentive
(for interior trajectories of the simplex), and similarly obtain a local Lyapunov function for
the dynamic. The function D0(x) = (1/2)||xˆ − x||2 is a global Lyapunov function for the
projection dynamic [23] [15]. A straight-forward computation shows that V = pDKL(x) +
(1− p)D0(x) is a Lyapunov function for ϕp = pϕ+ (1− p)ψ for all p ∈ [0, 1] (if xˆ is ESS for
both incentives).
We also give examples where the phase portrait qualitatively changes while keeping the
landscape constant. Let ϕ be the replicator incentive with the fitness landscape defined by
the RSP matrix A defined by a = b = 1, which has concentric (non-attracting) cycles and a
rest point at the barycenter of the simplex. If we take ψi =
∑3
j=i (Aij − x · Ax)+ = a = 1,
then the dynamic defined by ϕp has phase portrait with asymptotically stable rest point at
the barycenter (qualitatively as if b > a for an RSP matrix). The dynamic associated to ψ is
x˙i = a(1− 3xi), which has ISS at the barycenter [12], and exponential trajectories from x to
xˆ with rate −3a. Similarly, for a diverging RSP landscape, a constant incentive ψ can cause
the phase portrait to change to convergence to the barycenter, depending on the relative
values of p, a, and b. For instance, p = 0.9, a = 1, b = 2 is such an example. This shows
that addition of an alternative incentive can turn an unstable equilibrium into an ISS. It is
easy to see that the addition of a large enough constant incentive would do the same for all
p.
6. Discussion
We have considered mean dynamics for several models for the fixation of traits for organ-
isms that experience two distinct environments, encoded by changes in the fitness landscape
or changes in the evolutionary incentive. For deterministic models, we have shown that the
addition of a second landscape can alter the phase portrait of the population under one of the
environments alone, splitting up the parameter space for the probability p in various ways,
depending on the landscapes used, and whether the model uses a symmetric or asymmetric
landscape. We have shown that an alternative incentive may preserve the phase portrait
or alter it, in the process defining and analyzing novel evolutionary dynamics. For an anal-
ogous stochastic model, we see that the fixation probabilities are altered by the switching
landscapes, and that there are cases where fixation is unlikely under the stochastic model
but inevitable under the deterministic model.
Methods. Figure 2 was created with matplotlib [20].
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